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Putting Cano on ICE – A Path
Forward for Border Searches of
Electronic Devices
ABSTRACT
Across the country, circuit courts disagree over what level of
suspicion, if any, is required for border officials to search electronic
devices. This leaves law enforcement agencies in the lurch because they
must craft nationwide policies that cover jurisdictions with differing
rules. The Supreme Court should bring this quandary to an end by
holding that no reasonable suspicion or warrant is required for border
searches of electronic devices. Many scholars and litigants have called
for a reasonable suspicion or warrant requirement in light of Supreme
Court decisions like Riley and Carpenter that recognize the privacy
concerns raised by searches of electronic devices. However, a reasonable
suspicion or warrant requirement fails to account for the overwhelming
government interests at the US border, including ensuring national
security, controlling who and what enters the country, and combatting
transnational crime.
This Note calls upon the Supreme Court to reject limitations on
border searches and hold that no reasonable suspicion or warrant is
required for searches of electronic devices at the border. This holding
recognizes the government’s paramount interests and leaves room for
Congress to legislate additional protections as technology evolves.
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On an average day, officials at the border process more than one
million travelers entering the United States.1 For a handful of those
travelers, this processing includes a search of their electronic devices.2
Under the “border search” exception to the Fourth Amendment’s
warrant requirement, travelers crossing the border are subject to a wide
range of searches without any individualized suspicion requirement.3
In recent years, the border search doctrine has run headlong into

1.
This includes individuals crossing the border overland via ports of entry and those
entering the United States at the functional equivalent of the border, such as by ship or plane. On
a Typical Day in Fiscal Year 2019, CBP…, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT.,
https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/typical-day-fy2019 [perma.cc/U235-2C64] (Jan. 28, 2021).
Fiscal Year 2019 is the most recent data from prior to the COVID-19 pandemic. See id.
2.
In Fiscal Year 2020, Customs and Border Protection searched the electronic devices of
less than .1% of the travelers they processed. CBP Enforcement Statistics Fiscal Year 2021, U.S.
CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT., https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/cbp-enforcement-statistics
[https://perma.cc/TD2Y-AWU5] (last visited Mar. 29, 2022).
3.
E.g. United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 155–56 (2004) (requiring no
individualized suspicion to remove and search the gas tank of a passenger vehicle crossing the
border); see also United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 538 (1985) (“Routine
searches of the persons and effects of entrants are not subject to any requirement of reasonable
suspicion, probable cause, or warrant.”); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 154 (1925) (“Travelers may be so stopped in crossing an international boundary because of national
self-protection reasonably requiring one entering the country to identify himself as entitled to come
in, and his belongings as effects which may be lawfully brought in.”). The Fourth
Amendment guarantees that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” U.S.
CONST. amend. IV. However, the “border search” exception has been “a longstanding, historically
recognized exception to the Fourth Amendment’s general principle that a warrant be obtained.”
United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 621 (1977); see infra Section I.C.
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changing technological realities.4 The electronic devices many people
carry with them when traveling raise privacy questions beyond those
raised by searches of non-electronics.5 In 2011, a mere 35 percent of US
residents reported owning a smartphone.6 Today, however, 97 percent
of US residents own a cell phone, with 85 percent owning a
smartphone.7 As cell phones have become more prevalent, the privacy
interest implicated by cell phones and other electronic devices has
increased.8 Today, a cell phone, laptop, or even USB storage device
carries far more data than a similar device did a decade ago.9 As people
carry more personal information with them on electronic devices,
privacy advocates and criminal defendants have raised concerns
regarding government officials’ abilities to search these devices, both at
the border and elsewhere.10
In the last decade, privacy concerns surrounding cell phones
have reared their head at the border, where every year officials search
thousands of cell phones, laptops, and other electronic devices.11 These
searches have various goals, including intercepting child sexual abuse
material.12 Searches of electronic devices can be separated into two
4.
See, e.g., United States v. Cano, 934 F.3d 1002 (9th Cir. 2019).
5.
See, e.g., Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 393 (2014) (“Modern cell phones, as a
category, implicate privacy concerns far beyond those implicated by the search of a cigarette pack,
a wallet, or a purse.”).
6.
Id.
7.
Additionally, 77 percent of US residents own a desktop or laptop computer, and
53 percent own a tablet computer. Mobile Fact Sheet, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Apr. 7, 2021),
http://www.pewinternet.org/fact-sheet/mobile/ [https://perma.cc/ZAY7-YAAN].
8.
See, e.g., Riley, 573 U.S. at 393–94 (noting that the increased storage capacity of cell
phones leads to increased privacy interests).
9.
See, e.g., Sujeong Lim, Average Storage Capacity in Smartphones to Cross 80GB by
End-2019, COUNTERPOINT (Mar. 16, 2019), https://www.counterpointresearch.com/average-storage-capacity-smartphones-cross-80gb-end-2019/ [https://perma.cc/YSP2-GJF4] (indicating the average storage capacity of cell phones doubled from 2017 to 2019).
10.
See, e.g., Masood Farivar, At US Border, Dramatic Spike in Searches of Phones,
Electronic Devices, VOICE OF AM. (Oct. 28, 2017, 2:21 AM), https://www.voanews.com/a/us-borderspike-in-searches-of-phones-electronic-devices/4090013.html
[https://perma.cc/XJN8-QETC]
(highlighting that searches of electronic devices at the border have “sparked fresh legal challenges
from digital rights advocates and defendants in several criminal cases”).
11.
CBP Releases Updated Border Search of Electronic Device Directive and FY17
Statistics, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT., https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/national-media-release/cbp-releases-updated-border-search-electronic-device-directive-and#
[https://perma.cc/Z7RE-FLU9] (Feb. 3, 2021) (“In FY17, CBP conducted 30,200 border searches . . .
.”); CBP Enforcement Statistics Fiscal Year 2021, supra note 2 (revealing that CBP conducted
32,038 searches of electronic devices in FY 2020) [hereinafter CBP FY17 STATISTICS].
12.
See, e.g., United States v. Aigbekaen, 943 F.3d 713, 718 (4th Cir. 2019); United States
v. Touset, 890 F.3d 1227, 1230 (11th Cir. 2018); CBP FY17 STATISTICS, supra note 11 (“CBP border
searches of electronic devices have resulted in evidence helpful in combating terrorist activity,
[child sexual abuse material], violations of export controls, intellectual property rights violations,
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general categories: manual searches and forensic searches. A manual
(or “basic”) search occurs when an officer searches a device by hand
without any assistance from an external device or software.13 A forensic
(or “advanced”) search, on the other hand, involves connecting the
device to be searched to another separate device with extraction
capabilities, which is used to extract data from the searched device.14
Forensic searches can extract data not normally visible to a user, such
as data deleted by the user but still contained on the device.15
The two agencies tasked with safeguarding the US border, US
Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and US Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (ICE), both allow their officers and agents to
manually search electronic devices at the border without a warrant.16
Courts across the United States disagree over whether the border
search exception to the Fourth Amendment allows searches of
electronic devices at the border without individualized suspicion.17 The
US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently used the issue of
border searches of electronic devices to significantly limit the border
search exception as a whole, limiting the exception to searches for
contraband.18

and visa fraud.”). Although commonly referred to as “child pornography,” this Note will use the
terminology “child sexual abuse material” to more accurately reflect the ongoing damage and victimization that occurs each time these images and videos are shared. See generally Child Sexual
Abuse Material, NAT’L CTR. FOR MISSING & EXPLOITED CHILD., https://www.missingkids.org/theissues/csam [https://perma.cc/ZFA5-KZW9] (last visited Mar. 29, 2022); Glossary of Terms, INT’L
CTR. FOR MISSING & EXPLOITED CHILD.,
https://www.icmec.org/resources/glossary/
[https://perma.cc/JER4-9UGU] (last visited Mar. 29, 2022); Appropriate Terminology, INTERPOL,
https://www.interpol.int/en/Crimes/Crimes-against-children/Appropriate-terminology
[https://perma.cc/WK86-HBMQ] (last visited Mar. 29, 2022).
13.
Alasaad v. Mayorkas, 988 F.3d 8, 13 (1st Cir. 2021).
14.
Id. The terms “forensic” and “advanced” are used interchangeably by courts and law
enforcement agencies and will be used interchangeably in this Note.
15.
United States v. Kolsuz, 185 F. Supp. 3d 843, 849 & n.8 (E.D. Va. 2016), aff’d, 890
F.3d 133 (4th Cir. 2018).
16.
U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT., CBP DIRECTIVE NO. 3340-049A, BORDER SEARCH OF
ELECTRONIC DEVICES (2018), https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/assets/documents/2018Jan/CBP-Directive-3340-049A-Border-Search-of-Electronic-Media-Compliant.pdf
[https://perma.cc/CYJ4-82L8] [hereinafter CBP DIRECTIVE]; U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T, ICE
DIRECTIVE NO. 7-6.1, BORDER SEARCHES OF ELECTRONIC DEVICES (2009), https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/ice_border_search_electronic_devices.pdf [https://perma.cc/HWX6-4TJS] [hereinafter
ICE DIRECTIVE].
17.
Compare Alasaad, 988 F.3d at 18 (holding searches of electronic devices at the
border never require individualized suspicion), with United States v. Cano, 934 F.3d 1002, 1016
(9th Cir. 2019) (holding some searches of electronic devices at the border require reasonable
suspicion that contraband is on the device).
18.
Cano, 934 F.3d at 1018.
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Part I of this Note provides useful background information and
a history of the Fourth Amendment’s border search exception. In Part
II, this Note outlines the current landscape of searches of electronic
devices at the border, including the ongoing circuit split, the Supreme
Court’s recent denial of certiorari to a case that could have resolved this
split, and prior scholarship about the topic. Finally, Part III proposes
that the Supreme Court resolve the circuit split by holding that the
Fourth Amendment does not require reasonable suspicion or a warrant
for border searches of electronic devices, thus explicitly rejecting the
Ninth Circuit’s holdings in United States v. Cano.19
I. BACKGROUND AND HISTORY OF BORDER SEARCH
A. Agency Rules on Border Searches of Electronic Devices
Both CBP and ICE have agency policies that describe when their
officers and agents are allowed to search electronic devices at the
border;20 these policies also cover locations that are the functional
equivalent of the border, such as international airports.21 CBP’s policy
lays out two types of searches: basic and advanced.22 An advanced
search occurs when an investigator connects the electronic device in
question to another device or piece of equipment in order to “review,
copy, and/or analyze its contents.”23 A basic (or “manual”) search is any
search other than an advanced search.24 ICE’s original 2009 policy on
border searches of electronic devices did not differentiate between basic
and advanced searches, but since May 11, 2018, ICE has distinguished
them.25 Through the 2018 update, ICE’s policy now mirrors the
requirements of CBP’s policy, 26 which requires reasonable suspicion for
advanced searches, but no individualized suspicion of any kind for basic
searches.27

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Id. at 1002, 1018.
See generally CBP DIRECTIVE, supra note 16; ICE DIRECTIVE, supra note 16.
CBP DIRECTIVE, supra note 16, at 2; ICE DIRECTIVE, supra note 16, at 1.
CBP DIRECTIVE, supra note 16, at 4–5.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 4.
Alasaad v. Mayorkas, 988 F.3d 8, 14 (1st Cir. 2021).
Id.
CBP DIRECTIVE, supra note 16, at 4–5.
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Each year, thousands of electronic devices are searched at the
border.28 However, these searches are exceedingly rare compared to the
number of individuals that annually travel in and out of the United
States.29 In the 2017 fiscal year, CBP processed nearly four hundred
million travelers entering the United States.30 Of those travelers,
approximately thirty thousand had an electronic device searched, which
amounts to less than one out of every ten thousand inbound travelers.31
These numbers do not account for searches of outbound passengers,
who are also subject to border searches.32
B. Recent Supreme Court Rulings Regarding Cell Phones
In recent years, the Supreme Court has decided two prominent
cases regarding law enforcement searches of cell phones.33 Neither
dealt with the border search exception specifically.34 However, both
cases restrict law enforcement’s ability to search cell phones.35 Further,
both decisions note the unique and extensive privacy interests in the
phones.36 Carpenter v. United States and Riley v. United States are
commonly cited by proponents of a warrant requirement for searches of
electronic devices at the border to argue that electronic devices, such as
cell phones, pose unique Fourth Amendment questions.37
Carpenter is the more recent case of the pair, but is less relevant
to border search questions.38 The Court in Carpenter found that the
28.
CBP FY17 STATISTICS, supra note 11 (reporting that CPB conducted 30,200 border
searches in fiscal year 2017); Farivar, supra note 10 (estimating CBP searched 30,000 electronic
devices in 2017).
29.
Compare supra note 1 and accompanying text, with supra note 28 and accompanying
text.
30.
CBP FY17 STATISTICS, supra note 11.
31.
Id.
32.
E.g., United States v. Kolsuz, 890 F.3d 133, 137–38 (4th Cir. 2018) (involving a
border search of an outbound traveler’s cell phone).
33.
See generally Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018); Riley v. California,
573 U.S. 373 (2014).
34.
See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. 2206; Riley, 573 U.S. 373.
35.
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2223; Riley, 573 U.S. at 403.
36.
See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2218; Riley, 573 U.S. at 393.
37.
See, e.g., Rebecca M. Rowland, Note, Border Searches of Electronic Devices, 97 WASH.
U. L. REV. 545, 552 (2019) (“Together Riley and Carpenter set forth a strong defense for the
protection of digital data from warrantless searches.”); Sean O’Grady, Note, All Watched Over by
Machines of Loving Grace: Border Searches of Electronic Devices in the Digital Age, 87 FORDHAM
L. REV. 2255, 2281 (2019) (“[A]ll border searches of electronic devices should be considered
nonroutine in light of the emphasis in Riley and Carpenter on the substantial privacy interests
that individuals possess in their digital data stored on electronic devices.”); see also Carpenter, 138
S. Ct. 2206; Riley, 573 U.S. 373.
38.
See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. 2206.
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government needed a warrant to obtain cell-site location information.39
Location information is generated automatically and without the user’s
knowledge as his or her cell phone connects to the nearest cell site to
communicate with the carrier’s wireless network.40 Although
Carpenter’s holding on cell-site location information is not directly
applicable to border searches, its commentary on the privacy concerns
surrounding cell phones may be relevant.41
More applicable to border searches is Riley, which examines the
application of the “search incident to arrest” exception to cell phones.42
Search incident to arrest is an exception to the Fourth Amendment’s
warrant requirement which allows police officers to search a person
arrested for officer safety reasons and prevent the destruction of
evidence.43 The petitioner in Riley was arrested on weapons charges
after a traffic stop.44 Upon the petitioner’s arrest, the arresting officer
seized his cell phone and began to search it.45 Eventually, the officer
found a photograph on the phone, linking the petitioner to a recent
shooting, and the petitioner moved to suppress this evidence when he
was charged in relation to the shooting.46
The Riley Court decided in favor of the petitioner, ruling that the
search incident to arrest exception generally does not allow police
officers to search an arrestee’s cell phone.47 The Court conducted a
balancing test and examined whether the legitimate government
interests outweighed the level of intrusion upon the petitioner’s
privacy.48 On one hand, the government’s interests as they relate to the
search incident doctrine are not well served by searching a cell phone.49
Two primary government interests underlie the search incident
doctrine: officer safety and prevention of evidence destruction.50 In
Riley, the government’s only argument regarding officer safety was that
searching a cell phone might alert officers to accomplices or allies who
might be on their way to the scene to confront officers.51 The Court was
39.
Id. at 2221.
40.
Id. at 2211–12.
41.
Id. at 2217–21 (explaining that cell phones allow government officials to conduct
intrusive surveillance with less cost and effort than ever before).
42.
Riley, 573 U.S. at 380, 382–83.
43.
Id. at 383.
44.
Id. at 373.
45.
Id.
46.
Id.
47.
Id. at 386.
48.
Id. at 385–86.
49.
Id. at 386.
50.
Id.
51.
Id. at 387–88.
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unconvinced by this argument and pointed to the government’s lack of
real-world examples to support the conjecture.52 The Court was equally
unconvinced about the danger of evidence destruction if officers are
unable to search cell phones after arrests.53 Here, the Court found that
the government’s anecdotal examples of evidence destruction via
remote data wiping were not enough to show that it was a common
concern.54 Furthermore, there are various measures that officers can
take to prevent remote data wipes that do not involve cell phone
searches.55
The Riley Court found that, in contrast with the government’s
limited and uncertain interests in searching a cell phone after an arrest,
people have a significantly greater privacy interest in their cell phones
compared to other objects on their person.56 The sheer scope of data held
by cell phones—up to sixty-four gigabytes at the time of Riley—differs
from the amount of information stored in other mediums, which is
constrained by physical limitations.57 Further, cell phones contain
many types of data that a person would not typically carry with them
in physical form.58 Before cell phones, a man might carry a photo of his
wife or children in his wallet, whereas today, his phone could carry the
equivalent of multiple photo albums. In short, Riley acknowledges that
cell phone searches involve privacy concerns that are very different
from most other searches of items found on one’s person.59
C. History of Border Search
The Fourth Amendment to the US Constitution states: “The
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated . . . .”60 Since James Madison drafted the Fourth Amendment,
courts have recognized that searches at the border are fundamentally

52.
Id.
53.
Id. at 389–90.
54.
Id.
55.
Id. at 390.
56.
Id. at 393 (stating that comparing the privacy interest in other physical objects to the
privacy interest in a cell phone is akin to “saying a ride on horseback is materially
indistinguishable from a flight to the moon”).
57.
Id. at 393–34 (“Before cell phones, a search of a person was limited by physical
realities and tended as a general matter to constitute only a narrow intrusion on privacy.”).
58.
Id. at 394 (listing photographs, videos, bank statements, and addresses as
examples).
59.
See id.
60.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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different from searches in the interior of the United States.61 Just two
months before Congress sent the Bill of Rights to the states for
ratification, the same Congress adopted the nation’s first customs
statute.62 This statute gave customs officers far-reaching power to
search and seize goods entering the United States from abroad.63 The
Supreme Court recognized this early customs statute as informative in
the interpretation of the Fourth Amendment because it shows that the
Congress that proposed the Fourth Amendment viewed searches by
customs officers at the border to be reasonable for no reason other than
that they occur at the border or the functional equivalent thereof.64
The high-water mark for border search arguably came in 1977
in United States v. Ramsey.65 The defendant in Ramsey asked the
Supreme Court to require probable cause or a warrant for customs
officers to search inbound mail from foreign countries.66 The Court
rejected this invitation.67 The Court’s commentary in Ramsey on border
search as a general matter may be relevant when considering border
searches of electronic devices.68 Justice Rehnquist, writing for the
majority, stated that border searches “from before the adoption of the
Fourth Amendment, have been considered to be ‘reasonable’ by the
single fact that the person or item in question had entered our country
from outside.”69 According to Justice Rehnquist, border searches are per
se reasonable under the Fourth Amendment because they occur at the
border.70 Thus, by this logic, almost any search at the border is
permissible under the Fourth Amendment.
To see how far the Supreme Court has stretched the border
search exception to allow searches of property without reasonable
suspicion, one need look no further than United States v. FloresMontano.71 Officers at the border seized more than eighty pounds of
marijuana from the gas tank of the respondent’s 1987 Ford Taurus.72
When the respondent’s case went to court in the Southern District of
61.
United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616 (1977).
62.
Id.
63.
Id.
64.
See id. at 617–18; Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 623 (1886) (“[I]t is clear that
the members of that body did not regard searches and seizures of this kind as ‘unreasonable,’ and
they are not embraced within the prohibition of the amendment.”).
65.
431 U.S. 606.
66.
Id. at 607–09.
67.
Id. at 608.
68.
See id. at 619.
69.
Id.
70.
Id.
71.
See generally United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149 (2004).
72.
Id. at 150.
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California, the government did not argue that the officers who searched
the respondent’s vehicle had a warrant, probable cause, or even
reasonable suspicion.73 Instead, the government argued that the
officers were allowed to raise the vehicle up on a mechanical lift,
unfasten a series of straps and bolts, and physically remove the gas
tank from the vehicle simply because this search occurred at a port of
entry.74
Both the district court and the Ninth Circuit were unconvinced
by the government’s argument and held that reasonable suspicion is
required before the government can break out its power tools and
mechanical lifts to remove a person’s gas tank.75 The Ninth Circuit did
so summarily, without issuing a written opinion.76 In stark contrast,
the Supreme Court unanimously reversed.77 Although the Court in
Flores-Montano explicitly stated that it was not making any decision
regarding the level of suspicion required for “highly intrusive searches
of the person,” it held that no level of suspicion was required for the
type of gas tank search at issue.78 Notably, the Court declined to form a
balancing test to determine what constitutes a “routine” border
search.79
However, the Supreme Court has come closer to limiting
government conduct with respect to invasive searches of the person.80
In United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, the Court examined the case
of a traveler entering Los Angeles (LA) on a flight from Bogota,
Colombia.81 The respondent traveled to LA alone and recently made
multiple other trips to LA and Miami.82 Her explanation for the visit
did not add up—she was not packed appropriately for LA weather, had
no hotel reservations, and did not know how her airline ticket had been
bought.83 Based on her behavior, the inconsistencies of her story, and
Bogota’s reputation as an origin city for narcotics, the customs officers
at LA International Airport suspected the respondent was a “balloon

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id. at 151.
Id. at 151–52.
Id. at 151.
Id.
Id. at 150–51.
Id. at 152, 155.
Id. at 152.
See United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 533 (1985).
Id. at 532.
Id. at 533.
Id. at 533–34.
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swallower”—someone who smuggles narcotics in their alimentary canal
by swallowing and then passing them after clearing customs.84
At this point, officers gave the respondent three choices: leave
on the next flight bound for Colombia, consent to an X-ray of her
alimentary canal, or remain in detention until she produced a bowel
movement in which officers could search for narcotics.85 She initially
chose the x-ray, but changed her mind and asked to return to
Colombia.86 Officers could not get the respondent on a direct flight to
Colombia for many hours,87 and after holding her for sixteen hours, they
obtained a court order for an x-ray.88 Throughout her detention, the
respondent became increasingly uncomfortable as she engaged in what
the Ninth Circuit dubbed, “heroic efforts to resist the usual calls of
nature.”89 Following an examination, a physician recovered eighty-eight
balloons containing more than a pound of cocaine from the respondent’s
alimentary canal.90 The Court held that the respondent’s detention,
although beyond the scope of a routine border search, was permissible
because customs agents were in possession of facts that “clearly
supported a reasonable suspicion that respondent was an alimentary
canal smuggler.”91 However, the Court’s rule in the case is narrow,
applying only to situations where agents reasonably suspect a traveler
is an alimentary canal smuggler.92

84.
Id.
85.
Id. at 534–35.
86.
Id. at 535.
87.
The officers attempted to place Montoya de Hernandez on a flight to Bogota
connecting through Mexico City, but the airline refused to allow her to board because she did not
have the proper visa to enter Mexico. Id.
88.
Id.
89.
United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 731 F.2d 1369, 1371 (1984).
90.
Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 536–37.
91.
Id. at 542.
92.
Id. at 541.
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II. THE CURRENT LANDSCAPE OF BORDER SEARCHES OF ELECTRONIC
DEVICES
A. The Legal Landscape—A Circuit Split
In the wake of Flores-Montano and Montoya de Hernandez,93
lower courts have disagreed over what level of suspicion—if any—is
required to search electronic devices at the border.94
1. The Ninth Circuit’s Restrictive Approach
On one end of the spectrum sits the Ninth Circuit. In 2019, the
Ninth Circuit dramatically curtailed border searches of electronic
devices in Cano.95 The Ninth Circuit’s Cano decision represents a major
restriction on border searches of electronic devices.96 Even though the
Ninth Circuit concluded in 2013 that manually searching cell phones
does not require reasonable suspicion, Cano imposes a reasonable
suspicion requirement on forensic searches.97 In addition to this
reasonable suspicion requirement, Cano holds that the Fourth
Amendment’s border search exception is limited to searches for
contraband.98
In Cano, the Ninth Circuit dealt with a search of the
respondent’s cell phone.99 The respondent attempted to enter the
United States at the San Ysidro port of entry, where his vehicle was
sent for a secondary inspection.100 After a narcotics-detecting canine
signaled that it detected the odor of narcotics near the vehicle’s spare
tire, CBP officers searched the tire and discovered more than thirty
pounds of cocaine.101 Following this search, ICE Homeland Security
Investigations agents seized the respondent’s phone and searched it,
first manually and then forensically.102 The agents did not obtain a
warrant for these searches.103 According to the agents, the purpose of
93.
See generally id.; United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149 (2004).
94.
Compare United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952, 962 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding
forensic searches require reasonable suspicion), with United States v. Touset, 890 F.3d 1227, 1231
(11th Cir. 2018) (holding forensic searches do not require reasonable suspicion).
95.
See United States v. Cano, 934 F.3d 1002 (9th Cir. 2019).
96.
See id. at 1007.
97.
Id.
98.
Id. at 1020.
99.
Id. at 1007.
100.
Id. at 1008.
101.
Id.
102.
Id. at 1008–09.
103.
Id.
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their search was not to locate digital contraband, such as child sexual
abuse material, but to find either “investigative leads” regarding the
respondent’s case or “evidence of other things coming across the
border.”104 The Ninth Circuit found that both the manual and forensic
search violated the Fourth Amendment because they exceeded the
scope of the border search exception to the Fourth Amendment’s
warrant requirement.105 Thus, Cano strictly limits border search to
searches for contraband; searches for evidence of contraband or
evidence of ongoing border-related crime are not included in the Ninth
Circuit’s purview.106
2. The First and Eleventh Circuits’ Permissive Approaches
In stark contrast to Cano are a pair of cases from the First and
Eleventh Circuits.107 The first, United States v. Touset, is an Eleventh
Circuit decision which holds that no suspicion is required for searches
of electronic devices at the border.108 The second, Alasaad v. Mayorkas,
is a First Circuit case that rejects both of Cano’s holdings.109
On December 21, 2014, a CBP officer at Hartsfield-Jackson
Atlanta International Airport inspected the defendant’s luggage after
he entered the United States.110 The officer was alerted to the defendant
by a “look-out” from Homeland Security’s Cyber Crime Center, which
indicated officers should search the defendant’s electronic devices for
child sexual abuse material.111 CBP conducted forensic searches of two
laptops and two external hard drives confiscated from the defendant
and located child sexual abuse material on all four devices.112 ICE then
used the information from those searches to obtain a search warrant for
the defendant’s residence, where agents located thousands of pieces of
child sexual abuse material.113 The defendant moved to suppress the
evidence on the grounds that the original forensic search at the border
was a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights, and the resulting
104.
Id. at 1008.
105.
Id. at 1022.
106.
See id. at 1019.
107.
Compare Cano, 934 F.3d 1002, with United States v. Touset, 890 F.3d 1227 (11th Cir.
2018), and Alasaad v. Mayorkas, 988 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 2021).
108.
Touset, 890 F.3d at 1231.
109.
Alasaad, 988 F.3d at 20–21 (“We cannot agree with its narrow view of the border
search exception because Cano fails to appreciate the full range of justifications for the border
search exception beyond the prevention of contraband itself entering the country.”).
110.
Touset, 890 F.3d at 1230.
111.
Id.
112.
Id.
113.
Id.

832

VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.

[Vol. 24:4:819

evidence was the fruit of that unconstitutional search.114 The lower
court denied the defendant’s motion; he agreed to a plea deal in
exchange for a ten-year prison sentence, but reserved his right to appeal
the denial of his motion to suppress.115
The lower court in Touset denied the defendant’s motion to
suppress, holding that the forensic search required reasonable
suspicion and the government met that requirement.116 The Eleventh
Circuit affirmed, holding that the border search exception allows
manual and forensic searches of electronic devices without suspicion.117
The court stated that searches of property at the border are “reasonable
without suspicion ‘simply by virtue of the fact that they occur at the
border.’”118 The court further noted that neither the Eleventh Circuit
nor the Supreme Court had ever required reasonable suspicion for
searches of property at the border.119 According to the Touset court, only
searches of a person ever require reasonable suspicion; no border
searches of property, regardless of privacy interests, require reasonable
suspicion.120
In Alasaad, the First Circuit addressed a challenge brought by
a group of US citizens and a lawful permanent resident, all of whom
alleged that ICE or CBP searched their electronic devices on one or
more occasions.121 The US District Court for the District of
Massachusetts held that both manual and forensic searches require
reasonable suspicion, and, as in Cano,122 the border search exception is
limited to searches for contraband.123 The plaintiffs argued that the
First Circuit should go even further than the lower court and hold that
all searches of electronic devices require a warrant.124 Instead, the First

114.
Id. at 1229–31.
115.
Id. at 1231.
116.
Id.
117.
Id. at 1229, 1231–38.
118.
Id. at 1232 (quoting Denson v. United States, 574 F.3d 1318, 1339 (11th Cir. 2009)).
119.
Touset, 890 F.3d at 1233 (“The Supreme Court has never required reasonable
suspicion for a search of property at the border, however non-routine and intrusive, and neither
have we.”).
120.
See id.; see also United States v. Alfaro-Moncada, 607 F.3d 720, 728–31 (11th Cir.
2010) (holding reasonable suspicion is not required to search crew cabins on a ship, even though
“[a] cabin is a crew member’s home” and homes receive the highest level of Fourth Amendment
protection).
121.
Alasaad v. Mayorkas, 988 F.3d 8, 14 (1st Cir. 2021).
122.
United States v. Cano, 934 F.3d 1002, 1007 (9th Cir. 2019).
123.
Alasaad, 988 F.3d at 15.
124.
Id. at 16.
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Circuit held that both manual and forensic searches do not require
reasonable suspicion.125
Alasaad also directly addressed and rejected Cano’s contraband
limitation on border searches.126 The First Circuit defined the purpose
of border searches as controlling “who and what may enter the
country.”127 Based on this wider purpose, the First Circuit held that the
scope of border searches includes contraband and extends to evidence
of contraband or border-related crime.128 Also noteworthy, the court
addressed and rejected the invitation to extend the Supreme Court’s
Riley holding to the border search context.129
B. The Scholarly Landscape—In Favor of a Reasonable Suspicion or
Warrant Requirement
Most legal scholarship favors requiring either reasonable
suspicion or a warrant for border searches of electronic devices.130
Arguments in favor of such heightened requirements tend to contain
two general points: (1) electronic devices carry heightened privacy
interests, and (2) searches of electronic devices do not support the
purposes of the border search exception.131
Proponents of a reasonable suspicion or warrant requirement
argue that cell phones and other electronic devices carry heightened
privacy interests compared to other property.132 Computers and other
electronic devices have storage capacities that exceed all other mediums

125.
Id. at 19.
126.
Id. at 20–21.
127.
Id. at 20 (quoting United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 620 (1977)).
128.
Alasaad, 988 F.3d at 21.
129.
Id. at 17 (“Contrary to plaintiffs’ assertions, Riley does not command a warrant
requirement for border searches of electronic devices nor does the logic behind Riley compel us to
impose one.”).
130.
See, e.g., O’Grady, supra note 37 (advocating a reasonable suspicion requirement);
Ashley N. Gomez, Comment, Over the Border, Under What Law: The Circuit Split over Searches of
Electronic Devices on the Border, 52 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 279 (2020) (advocating a reasonable
suspicion requirement); Gina R. Bohannon, Comment, Cell Phones and the Border Search
Exception: Circuits Split over the Line Between Sovereignty and Privacy, 78 MD. L. REV. 563 (2019)
(advocating a warrant requirement); Rowland, supra note 37 (advocating a warrant
requirement). But see Michael Creta, Comment, A Step in the Wrong Direction: The Ninth Circuit
Requires Reasonable Suspicion for Forensic Examinations of Electronic Storage Devices During
Border Searches in United States v. Cotterman, 55 B.C. L. REV. ELEC. SUPPLEMENT 31 (2014) (advocating against a reasonable suspicion requirement).
131.
See, e.g., Bohannon, supra note 130, at 588–91, 594–97.
132.
Supra notes 128–31 and accompanying text; infra notes 133–35 and accompanying
text.
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of information.133 The sheer quantity of information on electronic
devices surpasses the amount of information that border officers could
find before the advent of these devices.134 Yet the quantity of
information is not the only concern; often, the personal nature of the
information stored on electronic devices also raises privacy concerns.135
Electronic devices carry sensitive information, such as bank and
medical records.136 These devices also often carry communications like
text messages and emails.137 Finally, the role that cell phones and other
electronic devices play in everyday life also raises privacy concerns. The
border search exception is limited to searches at the border or its
functional equivalents, such as international airports.138 Thus,
individuals can ordinarily avoid subjecting property to a border search
by not carrying it across the border.139 However, with cell phones and
other electronic devices, this is often easier said than done; most people

133.
See United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952, 964 (9th Cir. 2013) (explaining the
average laptop hard drive at the time could store “the equivalent of five floors of a typical
academic library”); Orin S. Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, 119 HARV. L. REV. 531,
542 (2005) (explaining an 80-gigabyte hard drive stores the equivalent of 40 million pages of information, approximately one floor of an academic library).
134.
United States v. Kolsuz, 890 F.3d 133, 145 (4th Cir. 2018) (“The sheer quantity of data
stored on smartphones and other digital devices dwarfs the amount of personal information that
can be carried over a border—and thus subjected to a routine border search—in luggage or a car.”);
Cotterman, 709 F.3d at 964 (“Even a car full of packed suitcases with sensitive documents cannot
hold a candle to the sheer, and ever-increasing, capacity of digital storage.”); Bohannon, supra note
130, at 589.
135.
See Kolsuz, 890 F.3d at 145 (noting the “uniquely sensitive nature” of the
information electronic devices contain); Cotterman, 709 F.3d at 964 (highlighting that electronic
devices “contain the most intimate details of our lives: financial records, confidential business documents, medical records and private emails”); Kathryn Neubauer, Note, Unlock Your Phone and
Let Me Read All Your Personal Content, Please: The First and Fifth Amendments and Border
Searches of Electronic Devices, 92 S. CAL. L. REV. 1273, 1276 (2019) (discussing how electronic devices store “extremely personal data”); O’Grady, supra note 37, at 2269 (acknowledging that
searches of electronic devices reveal “intimate data” and are “as intrusive as strip searches or bodycavity searches”).
136.
Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 400 (2014) (suggesting that a cell phone may
contain “every bank statement from the last five years”); Bohannon, supra note 130, at 590;
Rowland, supra note 37, at 550 (noting cell phones can contain prescription and banking
information).
137.
Kolsuz, 890 F.3d at 145 (stating electronic devices carry private emails); Cotterman,
709 F.3d at 964 (noting electronic devices carry private emails); Neubauer, supra note 135, at 1283;
Bohannon, supra note 130, at 590 (mentioning electronic devices carry spousal
communications); Sid Nadkarni, Comment, “Let’s Have a Look, Shall We?” A Model for
Evaluating Suspicionless Border Searches of Portable Electronic Devices, 61 UCLA L. REV. 146,
149 (2013) (describing how an individual whose laptop was searched by CBP found that agents
viewed “transcripts of chats with his girlfriend” and “copies of emails”).
138.
Supra note 21 and accompanying text.
139.
See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
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carry cell phones and electronic devices with them constantly as a part
of their everyday lives.140
The second main argument in favor of a reasonable suspicion or
warrant requirement is that cell phones and other electronic devices do
not support the purposes of the border search exception.141 According to
this argument, border searches of cell phones and other electronic
devices are not actually fulfilling the border search exception’s purpose
of controlling who and what enters the country.142 Instead, proponents
of heightened suspicion requirements argue that these searches are
used to either harass innocent travelers, or, more commonly, as “fishing
expeditions” to enforce laws unrelated to the border.143 As such,
heightened suspicion proponents advocate limiting the border search
exception’s applicability to electronic devices.144
C. Supreme Court Silence
The Supreme Court has yet to rule on what level of
individualized suspicion, if any, is required to search electronic devices
at the border. The Court rejected three petitions for a grant of certiorari
in 2021 that could have resolved the ongoing split amongst lower
courts.145 Two of those were for cases discussed extensively in this Note:
Alasaad and Cano.146

140.
See, e.g., Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2218 (2018) (asserting that individuals “compulsively carry cell phones with them”); Riley, 573 U.S. at 395 (“Now it is the person
who is not carrying a cell phone . . . who is the exception.”); Neubauer, supra note 135, at 1315.
141.
See, e.g., Bohannon, supra note 130, at 596–97; Nadkarni, supra note 137, at 193–94.
142.
See, e.g., Bohannon, supra note 130, at 598–99; Nadkarni, supra note 137, at 173–74.
143.
See, e.g., Bohannon, supra note 130, at 598–99; Nadkarni, supra note 137, at 173–74;
Alasaad v. Nielsen, No. 17-CV-11730-DJC, 2018 WL 2170323, at *5 (D. Mass. May 9, 2018) (alleging CBP supervisor told plaintiffs he ordered a search of their cell phones because he “felt like”
doing so).
144.
See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
145.
Aigbekaen v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 2871 (2021) (mem.); United States v. Cano, 141
S. Ct. 2877 (2021) (mem.); Merchant v. Mayorkas, 141 S. Ct. 2858 (2021) (mem.).
146.
See United States v. Cano, 934 F.3d 1002 (9th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 2877;
Alasaad v. Mayorkas, 988 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 2021), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 2858; see also supra Part
II.
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III. SOLUTION: NO REASONABLE SUSPICION, NO RESTRICTION TO
CONTRABAND ONLY, AND ROOM TO LEGISLATE ADDITIONAL
PROTECTIONS
The Supreme Court should resolve the current circuit split by
ruling that the border search exception to the Fourth Amendment’s
warrant requirement allows searches of electronic devices without
reasonable suspicion. The Supreme Court should also reject the Ninth
Circuit’s limitation of border searches in Cano by ruling that the border
search exception is not limited to searches for contraband.147 These
holdings would vindicate the longstanding history of border searches,
properly recognize the government’s overwhelming interests at the
border, and create a constitutional floor from which Congress can add
additional protections if and when they become necessary. A Supreme
Court holding that border searches of electronic devices do not require
reasonable suspicion is unlikely to lead to a dramatic alteration in the
number or nature of electronic devices searched by border officials.148
The Supreme Court should address the circuit split to create
nationwide uniformity. The current split amongst circuit courts is
untenable for the executive and legislative branches. CBP and ICE,
both executive branch agencies, operate nationwide and are tasked with
securing the US border, which includes functional equivalents like
international airports.149 These agencies’ policies govern their actions
across the country.150 More restrictive circuits thus effectively impose
nationwide limits on CBP and ICE unless the agencies are willing to
craft different policies in different circuits. Common sense dictates that
the federal government should have the same ability to search
electronic devices of inbound international passengers at the airport in
Los Angeles as it does in Miami, but the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits
have dramatically different standards for warrantless searches of
electronic devices at the border.151 By weighing in on the issue, the
Supreme Court can set a clear baseline for electronic device searches at
the border and allow the executive branch to freely craft its electronic

147.
See Cano, 934 F.3d at 1007.
148.
See infra Section III.D.
149.
CBP DIRECTIVE, supra note 16, at 2; ICE DIRECTIVE, supra note 16, at 1.
150.
See CBP DIRECTIVE, supra note 16 (containing no geographic differentiation for search
requirements); ICE DIRECTIVE, supra note 16 (containing no geographic differentiation for search
requirements).
151.
Compare Cano, 934 F.3d at 1016–17 (holding forensic searches of an electronic
device require reasonable suspicion contraband is contained on the device), with United States v.
Touset, 890 F.3d 1227, 1231 (11th Cir. 2018) (“[T]he Fourth Amendment does not require any
suspicion for forensic searches of electronic devices at the border.”).
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device search policies without limiting the agencies by requiring that
they operate under different rules in different circuits.
A. The Supreme Court Should Hold That No Reasonable Suspicion is
Required for Border Searches of Electronic Devices
The Supreme Court should not require reasonable suspicion for
any electronic device search—manual or forensic—at the border
because the government’s interests outweigh privacy interests.
Furthermore, Congress is better suited to determine the balance
between security and privacy. Reasonable suspicion is the highest
requirement for a search at the border; searches at the border “never
require a warrant or probable cause.”152 The Supreme Court has only
ever required reasonable suspicion for invasive searches of the person,
never for property.153 The distinction between persons and property
makes border searches more easily administrable by setting a clear and
easy-to-apply rule. Indeed, the Supreme Court in Flores-Montano
explicitly declined to create “[c]omplex balancing tests” for border
searches.154
The balance of interests at the border does not justify a
reasonable suspicion requirement; as stated previously, the Fourth
Amendment’s balancing test favors the government more at the border
than anywhere else.155 The government is uniquely interested in
protecting national security through border searches.156 Conversely,
travelers have a reduced expectation of privacy when they cross
international borders.157 Moreover, the Supreme Court has historically
given border officials wide latitude to search persons and effects
entering and leaving the United States.158 Electronic devices invoke
152.
United States v. Vergara, 884 F.3d 1309, 1311 (11th Cir. 2018); see United States v.
Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 619 (1977) (“There has never been any . . . requirement that the reasonableness of a border search depended on the existence of probable cause.”); Touset, 890 F.3d at 1232–
33.
153.
Touset, 890 F.3d at 1233 (“The Supreme Court has never required reasonable
suspicion for a search of property at the border, however non-routine and intrusive . . . .”).
154.
United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 152 (2004).
155.
See supra notes 61–64 and accompanying text; United States v. Montoya de
Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 539–40 (1985) (“[T]he Fourth Amendment balance between the
interests of the Government and the privacy right of the individual is . . . struck much more
favorably to the Government at the border.”).
156.
Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 152 (“The Government’s interest in preventing the entry
of unwanted persons and effects is at its zenith at the international border.”).
157.
Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 539 (“[T]he expectation of privacy [is] less at the
border than in the interior . . . .”).
158.
See, e.g., Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 155 (upholding “suspicionless inspections” of
vehicle gas tanks at the border); Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 544 (upholding hours-long

838

VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.

[Vol. 24:4:819

privacy concerns, but these concerns are overcome by the paramount
government interests at the border and fail to justify a reasonable
suspicion requirement.159
The Supreme Court has weighed privacy interests against the
government’s national security interests at the border before, and it has
consistently come down on the government’s side. In Montoya de
Hernandez, the Court noted that in cases of suspected alimentary canal
smuggling, the government will “rarely possess probable cause to arrest
or search,” but found the government’s interest in stopping cross-border
narcotics smuggling compelling enough to allow detention of suspected
smugglers with only reasonable suspicion.160 Likewise, in United States
v. Villamonte-Marquez, the Court held that customs officers are
permitted by statute and the Fourth Amendment to stop and search
any “vessel that is located in waters providing ready access to the open
sea” without any suspicion of wrongdoing.161 This is true even though
boats often serve as a dwelling for their owners, meaning boat searches
carry greater privacy concerns than searches of other vehicles.162 The
status quo as it relates to border searches strongly favors the
government.163 The government is not asking courts to strip Fourth
Amendment protections from travelers; rather, privacy advocates are
asking courts to extend Fourth Amendment protection to areas it has
never gone before.164
In the age of international terrorism, the government’s national
security interests are stronger than ever.165 The ease of electronic

detention of “suspected alimentary canal smuggler at the border”); United States v. Ramsey, 431
U.S. 606, 623–25 (1977) (upholding warrantless searches of international mail).
159.
Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 393 (2014) (stating that comparing the privacy
interest in other physical objects to the privacy interest in a cell phone is akin to “saying a ride on
horseback is materially indistinguishable from a flight to the moon”); Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at
152 (“[T]he Government’s interest in preventing the entry of unwanted persons and
effects is at its zenith at the international border.”).
160.
Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 541–42.
161.
United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579, 581, 593 (1983).
162.
See id. at 605–606 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also United States v.
Alfaro-Moncada, 607 F.3d 720, 728–31 (11th Cir. 2010) (holding reasonable suspicion is not
required to search crew cabins on a ship, even though “[a] cabin is a crew member’s home” and
homes receive the highest level of Fourth Amendment protection).
163.
See, e.g., United States v. Touset, 890 F.3d 1227, 1233 (11th Cir. 2018). The Supreme
Court has never required reasonable suspicion for searches of property, including electronic
devices, at the border. See id.
164.
See id.
165.
See United States v. Kolsuz, 890 F.3d 133, 152 (4th Cir. 2018) (Wilkinson, J.,
concurring) (“Our new world has brought inconvenience and intrusions on an indiscriminate basis,
which none of us welcome, but which most of us undergo in the interest of assuring a larger common good.”).
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communication has made international criminal and terrorist activities
easier to plan today than ever before.166 The ability of officers and
agents at the border to search electronic devices could be decisive in
whether a plot succeeds or fails.167 Despite the new threats posed by
electronic devices, privacy advocates seek to change the Fourth
Amendment’s application at the border, shifting the relative balance
between security and privacy away from security.168
As for those advocating for a warrant requirement, the response
is simple:169 warrants have never been required for even the most
intrusive searches at the border.170 If a warrant is not required for
“highly intrusive searches of the person,”171 it should not be required for
any searches of property, no matter how invasive. Even in the most
extreme border search cases like Montoya de Hernandez, where the
respondent was detained for sixteen hours and not allowed to use the
bathroom unmonitored, the Supreme Court required only reasonable
suspicion.172
Regardless of the proper balance between security and privacy,
Congress is better equipped to fashion rules regarding advanced
technologies, and the Supreme Court should allow Congress to do so.173
Even if the Supreme Court decides that the Fourth Amendment does
not require any individualized suspicion for searches of electronic
devices at the border, the Constitution merely sets the floor.174 Congress
can legislate to provide additional protections and restrictions, and it

166.
See id.
167.
See id.
168.
It is advocates, not the government, who seek to change the status quo. See id. (“To
give criminal enterprises the advantage of technological advancements and at the same time
impair access of law enforcement to those same developments risks recalibrating the Fourth
Amendment balance in a manner that does not comport with reasonableness.”); supra note 167
and accompanying text.
169.
See, e.g., Rowland, supra note 37 (“Together Riley and Carpenter set forth a strong
defense for the protection of digital data from warrantless searches.”).
170.
United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 619 (1977) (“There has never been any . . .
requirement that the reasonableness of a border search depended on the existence of probable
cause.”).
171.
United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 152 (2004).
172.
United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 541 (1985).
173.
Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 408 (2014) (Alito, J., concurring) (“Legislatures . . .
are in a better position than we are to assess and respond to the changes that have already occurred and those that almost certainly will take place in the future.”); Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth
Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L.
REV. 801, 806 (2004).
174.
United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 427–28 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring).
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has done so repeatedly in the wake of Supreme Court decisions on the
Fourth Amendment’s application to new technologies.175
New technologies often shift paradigms and challenge the
underlying assumptions of old judicial decisions regarding privacy.176
This causes judicially-made rules regarding technology to become
rapidly outdated.177 One example of this is the Supreme Court’s decision
in Katz v. United States, holding that the government cannot record
conversations in a telephone booth without a warrant.178 When Katz
was decided in the late 1960s, before the age of cell phones, public
telephones were a vital means of communication in the United
States.179 Today, nearly everyone in the United States owns a cell
phone, making public phones obsolete.180
Congress is best positioned to regulate changing technology
because, unlike the courts, Congress can regulate prospectively.181
Courts are limited to fashioning rules based on a specific set of facts
before them.182 In order for a case to make it to the Supreme Court, it
has to pass through a trial court and appellate court, which is
challenging in the criminal procedure context because the vast majority
of criminal cases end in plea agreements.183 Moreover, the Supreme
Court only hears a few dozen cases per year and often waits until there
are multiple circuit court decisions before it takes up an issue.184 This
Note is evidence of the Court’s limited capacity; despite published
decisions by multiple circuit courts that disagree with each other, the
Supreme Court has thus far declined to rule on the level of suspicion
required for border searches of electronic devices.185

175.
See id.; Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, tit. III, Pub. L. No.
90-351, 82 Stat. 197 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2520 (1986)) (imposing additional
requirements for electronic surveillance above and beyond those required by the Fourth
Amendment); Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA), Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100
Stat. 1848, 1849–50 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2511) (extending Title III requirements
to emails, text messages, and cell phone conversations); see also CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN,
ADVANCED INTRODUCTION TO U.S. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 51–53 (2020) (describing the passage of
Title III and the ECPA).
176.
See Kerr, supra note 173, at 859–60.
177.
Id. at 859.
178.
See generally Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
179.
Kerr, supra note 173, at 866–67.
180.
Ninety-seven percent of US residents own a cell phone. Mobile Fact Sheet, supra note
7.
181.
See Kerr, supra note 173, at 868.
182.
See id.
183.
Id.
184.
Id. at 868–69.
185.
Supra notes 145–46 and accompanying text.
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Unlike the courts, Congress is able to prospectively craft rules to
govern a technology before it even hits the market.186 Congress also has
access to a wider range of information than the courts through sources
like Congressional hearings.187 Additionally, multiple Supreme Court
Justices have acknowledged the particular difficulties posed by
questions of technology and privacy, as well as Congress’s comparative
advantages in balancing the opposing interests at play.188 So too, have
lower court judges; Judge J. Harvey Wilkinson III of the Fourth Circuit
addressed this issue directly in his concurrence in United States v.
Kolsuz, writing “the standard of reasonableness in the particular
context of a border search should be principally a legislative question,
not a judicial one.”189 In light of the legislature’s advantages, the best
thing that the Supreme Court can do is exercise the humility suggested
by Justice Breyer, maintain the status quo, and leave the balancing to
Congress.190
B. The Supreme Court Should Reject Cano’s Limits on Border Search
The Supreme Court should reject the Ninth Circuit’s limitations
on border searches for two reasons.191 First, contrary to the Ninth
Circuit’s assertions, it is not clear that border searches must be limited
to those that further the purposes of the border search exception.192
Second, even if this were true, searches for reasons other than locating
contraband still further the purposes of the border search exception—
controlling who and what enters the country.193

186.
Kerr, supra note 173, at 868.
187.
See id. at 875.
188.
Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 408 (2014) (Alito, J., concurring) (“Legislatures . . .
are in a better position than we are to assess and respond to the changes that have already
occurred and those that almost certainly will take place in the future.”); Stephen Breyer, Our
Democratic Constitution, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 245, 261 (2002) (describing the problem of electronic
privacy as “unusually complex” and stating “it suggests a need for judicial caution and humility
when certain privacy matters, such as the balance between free speech and privacy, are at
issue”).
189.
United States v. Kolsuz, 890 F.3d 133, 148 (4th Cir. 2018) (Wilkinson, J.,
concurring).
190.
See Breyer, supra note 188.
191.
United States v. Cano, 934 F.3d 1002, 1016–17 (9th Cir. 2019) (holding forensic
searches of an electronic device require reasonable suspicion contraband is contained on the
device).
192.
Alasaad v. Mayorkas, 988 F.3d 8, 19 (1st Cir. 2021) (explaining the Supreme Court’s
rule in Riley limiting warrantless searches to those that advance the purposes of an exception does
not, on its face, extend to the border search context).
193.
Id. (“[A] search for evidence of either contraband or a cross-border crime furthers the
purposes of the border search exception . . . .”); see United States v. Gurr, 471 F.3d 144 (D.C. Cir.
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There is no doubt that searches for contraband implicate the
border search exception’s purposes.194 Cell phones and other electronic
devices can transport digital contraband across the border.195 The most
serious type of digital contraband, seen in many of the cases referenced
in this Note, is child sexual abuse material.196 However, it is not the
only type of digital contraband. For example, the United States restricts
the export of certain software and technical data, especially software or
data with potential military uses.197 Another example of digital
contraband is pirated software.198 Border searches of electronic devices
help the government control the import and export of digital
contraband, fulfilling one of the purposes of the border search
exception.199
Cell phones and other electronic devices may contain evidence
related to contraband smuggling or other cross-border crimes.200 This
evidence is “vital to” controlling who and what enters the country.201 An
opinion authored by then-Judge Anthony Kennedy provides a useful
example.202 In United States v. Schoor, the defendant was convicted for
his role in a scheme that smuggled narcotics hidden inside radios from
Thailand to the United States.203 Tipped off by Drug Enforcement
Agency (DEA) agents, customs officers searched the defendant when he
entered the country.204 The DEA agent asked the officers to search for
narcotics and any documents related to air travel or radio shipments.205
2006) (“The distinction that [the defendant] would draw between contraband and documentary
evidence of a crime is without legal basis.”).
194.
See, e.g., Cano, 934 F.3d at 1013–14 (“We agree . . . the purpose of the border search
[exception] is to interdict contraband, but we disagree . . . that cell phones cannot contain
contraband.”).
195.
See, e.g., United States v. Aigbekaen, 943 F.3d 713, 718 (4th Cir. 2019); United States
v. Touset, 890 F.3d 1227, 1230 (11th Cir. 2018).
196.
See, e.g., Aigbekaen, 943 F.3d at 718; Touset, 890 F.3d at 1230.
197.
U.S. Export Controls, INT’L TRADE ADMIN., https://www.trade.gov/us-export-controls
[https://perma.cc/Q54J-CUSG] (last visited Apr. 1, 2022); see also United States v. Kolsuz, 890 F.3d
133, 152 (4th Cir. 2018) (Wilkinson, J., concurring) (“[T]here is the danger of highly
classified technical information being smuggled out of this country only to go into the hands of
foreign nations who do not wish us well and who seek to build their armaments to an ever more
perilous state.”).
198.
Nadkarni, supra note 137, at 175.
199.
See, e.g., Aigbekaen, 943 F.3d at 718; Touset, 890 F.3d at 1230.
200.
See, e.g., Alasaad v. Mayorkas, 988 F.3d 8, 21 (1st Cir. 2021) (“[B]order searches of
electronic devices may be used to search for contraband, evidence of contraband, or for evidence of
activity in violation of the laws enforced or administered by CBP or ICE.”).
201.
Id. at 20.
202.
See generally United States v. Schoor, 597 F.2d 1303 (9th Cir. 1979).
203.
Id. at 1305.
204.
Id.
205.
Id.
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The officers did not locate narcotics, but they did find documents related
to prior radio shipments from Thailand and airline tickets to and from
Thailand.206 The three-judge panel unanimously found the search and
seizure of the documents valid, holding that customs officers are
entitled to seize “instrumentalities or evidence of crimes.”207 Even
though the officers found no actual contraband, their search returned
valuable information for disrupting the cross-border shipment of
narcotics, thus fulfilling the border search exception’s purpose of
controlling what enters the country.208
Taken on its face, restricting border searches to looking for
contraband only leads to absurd results. Consider officers searching a
ship. One item the officers will surely want to examine is the
manifest.209 The officers know that they will probably not discover
contraband in the manifest’s paper and ink. Yet, examining the
manifest is useful in the officers’ efforts to control who and what enters
the country. It may provide details on the origin, destination, and
purported contents of the cargo shipment, all valuable information for
officers trying to differentiate legitimate cargo from contraband.210
However, following Cano, the manifest would be off-limits unless
officers could show that they reasonably suspected it contained
contraband.211 Such a limitation actively hinders the objectives of the
border search exception.
Finally, cell phones and other electronic devices may contain
evidence related to a person’s admissibility into the United States. The
Immigration and Nationality Act makes various classes of persons
ineligible for admission.212 Reasons for inadmissibility include past
criminal activity, national security concerns, and health concerns.213
When searching electronic devices, officers often discover information
that results in the denial of US entry.214 Although this information is

206.
Id.
207.
Id. at 1306.
208.
Id.
209.
A manifest lists all items aboard a vessel, including ship’s stores, crew members’ personal effects, and cargo. 19 C.F.R. § 4.7a (2021).
210.
See id.
211.
United States v. Cano, 934 F.3d 1002, 1016 (9th Cir. 2019) (holding some searches of
electronic devices at the border require reasonable suspicion contraband is on the device).
212.
8 U.S.C. § 1182.
213.
Id.
214.
E.g., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., OIG-19-10, CBP’S SEARCHES OF ELECTRONIC
DEVICES AT PORTS OF ENTRY 2 (2018), https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/201812/OIG-19-10-Nov18.pdf [https://perma.cc/SSD9-4VDK] (discussing how a CBP officer denied a
traveler entry after finding terrorist-related materials on the traveler’s phone).
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not itself illegal nor contraband, its discovery promotes the objective of
the border search exception to control who enters the country.
C. The Challenges to Applying Riley and Carpenter
Those arguing that Riley and Carpenter should inform the future
handling of border searches of electronic devices face three
challenges.215 First, the Fourth Amendment’s balancing test favors the
government more at the border than it does anywhere else.216 Second,
searching electronic devices at the border advances the government
interests that underlie the border search exception, unlike in Riley,
where searches of cell phones did not advance the purposes of the search
incident to arrest exception.217 Finally, Riley and Carpenter both deal
specifically with cell phones, not electronic devices, more broadly.218
Fourth Amendment balancing at the border is different from
Fourth Amendment balancing elsewhere.219 Indeed, searches in the
interior that would be unconstitutional without a warrant are often
permissible at the border without reasonable suspicion.220 The Supreme
Court has repeatedly recognized that the government’s interests are at
their peak at the border.221 Conversely, the Supreme Court has
repeatedly recognized that privacy interests are at their nadir at the
border.222 The unique balance of interests at the border precludes the
blind application of the Fourth Amendment doctrine used in the interior
at the border.
One rationale underlying the Riley holding is the Court’s finding
that the justifications for the search incident to arrest exception to the
Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement are not implicated by
searches of electronic devices.223 Despite assertions to the contrary,

215.
See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018); Riley v. California, 573 U.S.
373 (2014).
216.
United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 539–40 (1985) (“[T]he Fourth
Amendment balance between the interests of the Government and the privacy right of the
individual is . . . struck much more favorably to the Government at the border.”).
217.
Supra notes 49–55 and accompanying text.
218.
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2211; Riley, 573 U.S. at 378.
219.
See Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 539–40.
220.
See, e.g., United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 155–56 (2004) (permitting
searches of a vehicle’s gas tank with no individualized suspicion).
221.
See, e.g., Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 152 (“The Government’s interest in preventing
the entry of unwanted persons and effects is at its zenith at the international border.”); supra note
216.
222.
See, e.g., Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 154 (“[T]he expectation of privacy is less at the
border than it is in the interior.”); supra note 216.
223.
Supra notes 49–55 and accompanying text.

2022]

PUTTING CANO ON ICE

845

searches of electronic devices do implicate the border search exception’s
underlying motivations.224 The government has a strong interest in
controlling who and what enters the country.225 Searches of electronic
devices contribute to the discovery of contraband, evidence of
contraband, and evidence related to a noncitizen’s admissibility.226
Riley and Carpenter both decided questions explicitly related to
cell phones.227 However, these are not the only electronic devices that
CBP and ICE encounter at the border.228 Both agencies’ policies allow
them to search a variety of electronic devices other than cell phones.229
Published agency statistics do not break down searches by type of
electronic device, but it is reasonable to assume that some of the
thousands of searches that officers conduct are of devices besides cell
phones.230
Riley, the more pertinent of the cases discussed in this Section,
rests on two prongs.231 The first is the unique privacy interests
implicated by cell phones.232 The second is the poor fit between (a) the
purposes underlying the search incident to arrest exception to the
Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement and (b) the results of cell
phone searches incident to arrest.233 In the border search context,
privacy interests are weighed very differently from other situations.234
Furthermore, cell phone searches strongly implicate the purposes of the
border search exception.235 Finally, border officials deal with many
devices besides cell phones, and a one-size-fits-all approach to the
224.
Supra note 141 and accompanying text.
225.
Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 152 (“The Government’s interest in preventing the entry
of unwanted persons and effects is at its zenith at the international border.”); United States v.
Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 620 (1977) (“The border-search exception is grounded in the recognized
right of the sovereign to control . . . who and what may enter the country.”).
226.
Alasaad v. Mayorkas, 988 F.3d 8, 21 (1st Cir. 2021) (“Advanced border searches of
electronic devices may be used to search for contraband, evidence of contraband, or for evidence of
activity in violation of the laws enforced or administered by CBP or ICE.”).
227.
Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 378 (2014); Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct.
2206, 2211 (2018).
228.
See, e.g., CBP DIRECTIVE, supra note 16, at 2 (defining electronic device to include
“computers, tablets, disks, drives, tapes, mobile phones and other communication devices,
cameras, music and other media players”); ICE DIRECTIVE, supra note 16, at 2 (using the same
definition for electronic device as the CBP Directive).
229.
Supra note 228.
230.
CBP FY17 STATISTICS, supra note 11 (“In FY17, CBP conducted 30,200 border
searches . . . ”); CBP Enforcement Statistics Fiscal Year 2021, supra note 2 (indicating that CBP
conducted 32,038 searches of electronic devices in FY 2020).
231.
Riley, 573 U.S. at 385–86.
232.
Id.
233.
Id.
234.
Supra note 216.
235.
See supra notes 193–213 and accompanying text.
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variety of electronic devices risks treating other devices as though they
carry the same privacy implications as cell phones.236 Because both
prongs of the Riley decision are more favorable to the government at the
border and border searches of electronics include devices besides cell
phones, Riley’s warrant requirement should not be transferred to
border searches.237
D. Real-World Impacts of This Solution
The effects of imposing a nationwide standard eschewing a
reasonable suspicion requirement and allowing searches for more than
contraband would be limited. The proposed standard will ease the
administrability of these searches by reducing the number of “cookiecutter” warrant applications for electronic device searches. It will also
set a clear constitutional floor, from which Congress can legislate
increased protections as technology evolves.
A holding creating a nationwide standard that requires no
individualized suspicion for searches of electronic devices at the border,
and allows searches for more than just contraband, is unlikely to change
the number of searches for two reasons. First, the government is limited
in the number of searches it can carry out as a practical matter. Second,
the executive branch is incentivized to limit controversial searches as a
policy matter to avoid imposing new statutory limits.
The government’s finite resources naturally limit how many
searches government officials can conduct.238 On average, more than
one million people enter the United States each day and must be
processed by border officials.239 This naturally limits the amount of time
the government can spend scrutinizing each traveler. Just as the
government does not have the time nor resources to inspect every
vehicle that crosses a port of entry, it also cannot inspect more than a
small percentage of the electronic devices that cross the border. If
technological advancements change this reality, Congress can regulate
when and how officers search electronic devices, or the executive branch
can restrain itself through regulations.
Due to the looming possibility of federal legislation, CBP and
ICE are incentivized to avoid controversy by self-regulating. One
criticism of border searches of electronic devices is that officers and
agents may target individuals for searches without a law enforcement
236.
See supra note 228.
237.
See Riley, 573 U.S. 373.
238.
Today, less than .1% of border-crossers have their electronic devices searched. Supra
notes 1–2 and accompanying text.
239.
Supra note 1.
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justification.240 Both CBP and ICE already have policy limitations that
require reasonable suspicion for advanced searches, even though some
circuits do not require it.241 Congress and the President are responsive
to public pressure, and border searches of electronic devices have
received coverage in various media outlets.242 This attention pushes
CBP and ICE to restrain themselves to avoid external limitations from
Congress or the President.243

240.
E.g., Alasaad v. Nielsen, No. 17-CV-11730-DJC, 2018 WL 2170323, at *5 (D. Mass.
May 9, 2018) (alleging CBP supervisor told plaintiffs he ordered a search of their cell phones
because he “felt like” doing so). The plaintiffs in Alasaad also raised several other concerns. Id. at
*5–8. Some of the plaintiffs alleged that allowing male CBP agents to view photos on their electronic devices of the plaintiffs without their religious headscarves violated the plaintiffs’ religious
beliefs. Id. at *5, *7, *22. Another plaintiff alleged CBP agents viewed privileged communications
between attorney and client contained on his phone. Alasaad v. Nielsen, 419 F. Supp. 3d 142, 149–
50 (D. Mass. 2019); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 664 (2009) (discussing the federal
government’s response to the 9/11 attacks and stating “it is not surprising that a legitimate policy
directing law enforcement to arrest and detain individuals because of their suspected link to the
attacks would produce a disparate, incidental impact on Arab Muslims”). But see CBP Policy on
Nondiscrimination in Law Enforcement Activities and All Other Administered Programs, U.S.
CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT., https://www.cbp.gov/about/eeo-diversity/policies/nondiscriminationlaw-enforcement-activities-and-all-other-administered [https://perma.cc/G7GK-U9XN] (Feb. 24,
2020) (“It is the policy of [CBP] to prohibit the consideration of race or ethnicity in law enforcement,
investigation, and screening activities, in all but the most exceptional circumstances.”); CBP
DIRECTIVE, supra note 16, at 1 (“CBP will protect the rights of individuals against unreasonable
search and seizure and ensure privacy protections while accomplishing its enforcement mission.”);
ICE DIRECTIVE, supra note 16, at 2–3 (requiring Special Agents in Charge ensure all agents they
supervise complete required “training programs relevant to border searches of electronic devices,
including constitutional, privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties training related to such searches”).
241.
Supra notes 26–27 and accompanying text.
242.
Cristina M. Rodríguez, Constraint Through Delegation: The Case of Executive Control
over Immigration Policy, 59 DUKE L.J. 1787, 1804, 1807 (2010); see, e.g., Matthew S. Schwartz,
ACLU: Border Agents Violate Constitution when They Search Electronic Devices, NPR (May 2,
2019, 5:10 AM), https://www.npr.org/2019/05/02/719337356/aclu-border-agents-violate-constitution-when-they-search-electronic-devices [https://perma.cc/JW3K-53XL]; Ron Nixon, Cellphone
and Computer Searches at U.S. Border Rise Under Trump, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 5, 2018)
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/05/us/politics/trump-border-search-cellphone-computer.html
[https://perma.cc/WQ6V-CEHR].
243.
In fall 2021, a bipartisan group of Senators introduced a bill to limit border searches
of electronic devices. Chris Mills Rodrigo, Lawmakers Introduce Bill to Limit Data Collection
at Border Crossings, THE HILL (Oct. 7, 2021, 3:21 PM), https://thehill.com/policy/technology/575806-lawmakers-introduce-bill-to-limit-data-collection-at-border-crossings
[https://perma.cc/96F2-NUSH].
The
principal
architects
of
the
bill
were
Democratic Senator Ron Wyden of Oregon and Republican Senator Rand Paul of Kentucky. Id.

848

VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.

[Vol. 24:4:819

IV. CONCLUSION
The border search exception to the Fourth Amendment’s
warrant requirement dates back almost to the adoption of the
amendment itself and is crucial to safeguarding the United States by
controlling who and what crosses the border.244 As times have changed,
so have the types of contraband that cross the border and the ways in
which they are concealed.245 In recent years, various courts have
grappled with the question of how to apply the border search exception
to electronic devices.246 Different circuits have come to different
conclusions; some treat electronic devices like other types of property
and allow searches without reasonable suspicion, while others require
reasonable suspicion.247 In Cano, the Ninth Circuit did even more by
requiring reasonable suspicion that an electronic device contains
contraband in order for officers to search it under the border search
exception.248
It is time for the Supreme Court to weigh in, something it
declined to do in 2021 despite ample opportunity.249 The Supreme Court
should hold that no reasonable suspicion is required for border searches
of electronic devices.250 The Court should also address and reject the
Ninth Circuit’s limitations on border searches imposed in Cano.251
Border searches of electronic devices further the purposes of the border
search exception—to control who and what enters the United States.252
Searches do this by discovering contraband and evidence of contraband
and evidence of a person’s admissibility to the United States.253
Rejecting Cano and allowing searches without reasonable suspicion will
provide a constitutional floor upon which Congress can legislate
additional protections as needed.254 Congress is better situated to craft
rules regulating privacy in evolving technology, and the Supreme Court
should leave Congress the room to do so.255 A holding by the Supreme
Court that no reasonable suspicion is necessary for border searches of

244.
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electronic devices is unlikely to lead to major changes in the number or
nature of searches, but will provide the necessary uniformity for
agencies like CBP and ICE to operate.256
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